The vacant unit was in the same shopping center. Same strip, same parking lot. The landlord wanted to move its tobacco shop tenant into it, the tenant was willing because the space was bigger, and the tenant’s owner told the property manager that he works with cities all the time and that the two of them would figure this out.[1]
The City of St. Paul denied the license. Twenty-six months later the tenant lost the lease and the eviction appeal.
Sibley Plaza Limited Partners, LP v. MSP Tobacco and Vapor, Inc. was decided by the Minnesota Court of Appeals on 20 July 2026. It is nonprecedential, which in Minnesota means it binds nobody but may be cited as persuasive authority.[2] It is also the cleanest illustration I have seen of something that sits in a great many retail leases and gets read as boilerplate: a relocation clause moves the premises, and the operating license stays at the old address.
The clause that terminates when nobody agrees#
The original lease dates to 2011. In November 2019 the parties amended it, extending the term through 31 December 2024 and adding an option for one five-year renewal if the tenant was not in default. The same amendment added paragraph 16:[1]
16. Relocation. At Landlord’s option, and upon ninety (90) days written notice to Tenant . . . , Landlord may relocate Tenant into an alternative premises within the Shopping Center, which premises shall be mutually agreeable to Landlord and Tenant. . . . In the event the terms of the relocation cannot be agreed upon between Landlord and Tenant within sixty (60) days after Landlord’s delivery of the Relocation Notice, then at Landlord’s option Landlord may terminate this Amended Lease and Tenant shall be required to vacate the Premises on [or] before the expiration of the ninety (90) day period following delivery of the Relocation Notice.
Read the first sentence and the clause looks like a tenant win. The landlord cannot dump you anywhere. The replacement space has to be inside this shopping center, and it has to be mutually agreeable, which is to say you have a veto.
Now read the second sentence. The veto is the termination trigger. If the terms cannot be agreed within sixty days, the landlord may end the lease. Not the tenant. Whatever reason the tenant has for not agreeing, good or bad, the sixtieth day arrives and the landlord has an option it did not have before. It is the same shape as a recapture right the tenant never negotiated for: the tenant thinks it is negotiating, and the document treats the absence of agreement as a completed condition.
On 17 May 2024 the landlord served the relocation notice, said it would elect to terminate effective 31 August if the parties failed to agree, offered an extension to 30 September if the tenant appealed a license denial, and said it retained discretion to allow more time to work through the city process. That is not the conduct of a landlord engineering a termination, and it mattered later.[1]
The license belongs to the address, not to the business#
St. Paul licenses tobacco retail under chapter 324 of its Legislative Code, and every load-bearing provision points at a location rather than at a company. Section 324.02 is titled “License for each location” and says a license “permits the licensee to sell licensed products at retail at the one (1) location specified in said license, and a separate license is required for each location.” Section 324.05 finishes the job in a sentence: “Any change in the location of the place of sale will require a new license application."[3]
So the tenant applied for a new license, which is the correct and only procedure. Two provisions then closed in on it.
One is the cap. Section 324.04(b)(1) limits the city to one hundred tobacco shop licenses and fifteen tobacco products shop licenses. MSP Tobacco applied for a tobacco products shop license, the scarcer of the two, and the scarcity is not arbitrary: elsewhere in the chapter, a tobacco products shop license is the one exception to St. Paul’s flavored product ban, so it is the license that makes a vape business a vape business.[3] Fifteen of them exist. The cap has a grandfather rule, and the grandfather runs to “[e]stablishments or locations holding either tobacco shop or tobacco product shop licenses on July 31, 2021,” subject to conditions. Establishments or locations. The protection attaches to the unit.
The other is the buffer. Section 324.04(b)(2): “No tobacco license may be issued to a person, firm, or corporation for any establishment located within one-half mile (2,640 feet) of another establishment possessing a tobacco license.” And then the measurement rule, which is the part that decides this case: “[s]aid one-half mile being calculated and computed as the distance measured from the property line of the premises or building proposed as the location for the tobacco license to the property line of any other tobacco license."[3]
Property line to property line. If the shopping center sits on a single parcel, the property line of the proposed unit and the property line of the existing licensed unit are the same line and the measured distance is zero. The opinion does not say how Sibley Plaza is platted and I have not checked the Ramsey County parcel records, so I will not claim it was literally zero feet. Two storefronts in one strip are nowhere near half a mile apart under any method of measuring.
The city denied the application under section 324.04(b)(1) and (2). The thing standing between MSP Tobacco and its new license was MSP Tobacco’s old license, a few doors down the same strip.
Now the part worth sitting with. The geographic limit in paragraph 16, the words “within the Shopping Center,” is the clause’s tenant protection. It is what stops a landlord moving a destination retailer out of the anchor’s sight line and off to a service road, and courts read it in the tenant’s favor when landlords stretch it. In a jurisdiction with a buffer rule, that same limit guarantees every space the landlord may offer sits inside the radius that makes the license unobtainable. A relocation four hundred feet away fails where three thousand feet would have been fine.
Force majeure extended the deadline and did not excuse the move#
The tenant’s first argument was the force majeure clause, Article 37, which reads in relevant part that the time to perform “shall be extended to the extent that the performance of such act or acts shall be delayed by . . . governmental regulations or controls, . . . or any other cause beyond the reasonable control of such party."[1]
A distance ordinance is a governmental regulation. The tenant said so, and argued that its time to perform under the relocation clause was therefore suspended for as long as the ordinance stood.
The court took the words apart with a dictionary. “Delay” means to postpone until a later time; “extend” means to put off, postpone. Both describe a temporary shift, while the tenant’s reading “effectively excuses MSP Tobacco from performance of the relocation clause altogether.” Then the line that belongs on every drafting checklist: “If the parties intended for the clause to allow for indefinite delays caused by force majeure events, they could have included such language in the contract.” The court cited Clark v. City of St. Paul as an example of language that excuses performance outright.[4]
The landlord had a second argument the court did not need to reach, and it is a good one. The ordinance never stopped MSP Tobacco complying with the lease. It stopped MSP Tobacco selling tobacco. The tenant could have moved into the new unit and run a business that needs no tobacco license. A force majeure clause protects your ability to perform the lease, not the profitability of the thing you perform it for.[1]
This is the same fault line as a government order that closes the premises while the abatement clause never fires, and it runs through the Minnesota COVID lease cases too. In Fitness International, LLC v. City Center Ventures, LLC, decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court on 24 July 2024, a health club closed for roughly three and a half months by executive order tried to recover the rent it paid. The court accepted that temporary frustration of purpose is a real doctrine in Minnesota, borrowed the Restatement framework, and then held that temporary frustration “suspends the obligor’s duty to perform while the impracticability or frustration exists but does not discharge his duty.” Suspended, not discharged. The tenant lost.[5]
Minnesota keeps telling commercial tenants that a temporary excuse buys time and nothing else, and drafters keep writing “extended” and “delayed” when what they mean is “and if it never clears up, we are both out.”
Cooperation is a defense, and the emails proved it#
The tenant’s second argument was the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Every Minnesota contract carries one, and it requires that a party “not unjustifiably hinder the other party’s performance of the contract.” A party may also not “take advantage of the failure of a condition precedent when the party itself has frustrated performance of that condition.” Bad faith means refusing to fulfill an obligation “based on an ulterior motive,” and it does not include “asserting or enforcing its legal and contractual rights."[6]
On paper the tenant had something. The landlord invoked a clause knowing the license was location specific, and the resulting failure of the condition handed the landlord a termination right. Frustrating a condition and then living off the failure is what the Hennepin County case forbids.
The record killed it. When the license was denied, the landlord’s property manager started emailing St. Paul officials to get the ordinance amended. A legislative aide to the city council wrote back that it would take a code change, that “MSP [Tobacco] ha[d] followed the letter of the law and the expectations of its license,” and that he hoped the council would “be able to make some space for them in the code.” By October 2024 the aide reported they had “the votes to get this done” and the item was on the early November agenda.[1]
Then the “unhappy update.” The ordinance came off the agenda “after [he] received a tip regarding MSP’s failure to abide state law and city ordinance.” The city sent MSP Tobacco a Notice of Violation and Request for Imposition of $500 Matrix Penalty: an inspector had seen discounted tobacco products, which section 324.07(k) forbids along with coupons and multi-pack deals such as buy-two-get-one-free.[3] MSP Tobacco denies the violation, and the court of appeals said whether it happened was immaterial. The amendment was dead either way. Whether the council would have passed it in a quieter month, nobody can say. The landlord terminated effective 31 January 2025, writing that “[d]ue to this development caused by Tenant’s sale of illegal products,” no further time would be given.
On those facts the court found no genuine issue of material fact. The landlord had talked to the tenant, talked to the city, advocated for the amendment, and tracked it until it died. Six months of lobbying somebody else’s regulator is not an unjustifiable hindrance.
Note what actually won. Not a clause. An email folder. If you exercise a discretionary right and the counterparty then cannot perform, the contemporaneous record of your attempts to help is the asset. Build it while it is cheap.
The forum decided the case before the merits could#
The tenant’s third set of arguments was the common law: impossibility, impracticability, frustration of purpose. Relocating was illegal, so performance was excused.
These arguments never got examined, because of where the case was. The landlord did not sue for breach. It filed an eviction, and in Minnesota an eviction is a summary proceeding “intended to adjudicate only the limited question of present possessory rights to the property.” Defenses are correspondingly narrow: the statute names a few, and the two the supreme court has recognized at common law, breach of the covenant of habitability and retaliation, are residential only.[7]
In SVAP III Riverdale Commons LLC v. Coon Rapids Gyms, LLC (2021), a gym that stopped paying rent during the COVID closures tried to raise impossibility and frustration in an eviction action. The court of appeals declined to recognize them, on the ground that extending the common law is the supreme court’s job and not its own, and noted that the current eviction statute, unlike the one in force in 1973, no longer lets a defendant plead “all matters in excuse, justification, or avoidance."[8]
MSP Tobacco argued SVAP III was limited to nonpayment cases. The court disagreed twice over: the 2021 opinion said nothing about other eviction types, and the same institutional reason for restraint applies anyway. So impossibility and frustration of purpose are unavailable in a Minnesota commercial eviction, full stop.
The SVAP III footnote is where the tenant’s remedy went. Nothing stops a tenant asserting those doctrines “in another type of action, such as an action by [landlord] to recover damages for [tenant’s] unpaid rent, an action by [tenant] for reformation or rescission, or an action by [tenant] alleging ejectment,” and an eviction judgment does not bar a later suit about the lease.[8] The defense exists. It exists in a different case, filed later, by a tenant already put out of the space its license was attached to. For a business whose license is the business, damages in 2028 are not the same product as the unit.
Article 31 finished the job. A tenant remaining in possession after the expiration date without a new lease occupies month to month, cancelable “by notice effective at the end of the calendar month first succeeding the thirtieth day following the date of notice."[1] On 13 February 2025 the landlord told MSP Tobacco it was now month-to-month and terminated that tenancy effective 31 March. MSP Tobacco stayed. On 25 April came a notice to quit effective 31 May, and the complaint in June.
The tenant also argued it had exercised its five-year renewal option before the relocation notice arrived. The court disposed of that in a footnote: even if the option was exercised, the termination under paragraph 16 ended the lease.[1] A renewal option is a term, and a relocation clause with a termination limb outranks it. Pair that with what happens when an option to renew dies on its notice date and with what a landlord does by accepting holdover rent. Holding over is a status the lease defines in advance, and here it was defined against the tenant.
Which tenants have a license bolted to the address#
Tobacco is a conspicuous example rather than a special one.
Liquor is the oldest example. Minnesota defines the licensed premises as the premises described in the approved license application, caps off-sale licenses at one “to any one person or for any one place,” and bars any intoxicating liquor license in areas zoned against commercial use or within 1,000 feet of a state hospital, reformatory, prison, or certain other institutions.[9] Relocate a liquor store within a center and every one of those tests is rerun against the new address.
Cannabis retail is the newest, and the buffers are tighter than tobacco’s where it counts. Minnesota lets a local government prohibit a cannabis business within 1,000 feet of a school, or 500 feet of a day care, a residential treatment facility, or an attraction in a public park regularly used by minors such as a playground.[10] A four-hundred-foot move inside one center can cross a schoolyard buffer the original unit sat outside.
Controlled substances are federal and unforgiving. Under 21 C.F.R. 1301.12(a), “[a] separate registration is required for each principal place of business or professional practice at one general physical location where controlled substances are manufactured, distributed, imported, exported, or dispensed."[11] Move a pharmacy or an infusion suite to the unit next door and that is a new principal place of business and a new registration, on the DEA’s schedule rather than the landlord’s ninety days.
Plenty of ordinary uses carry site-specific approvals too: certificates of occupancy, conditional use permits, drive-through and signage approvals, child care licenses, food establishment licenses. I have not run the statute for each of those in each state, so treat the list as a prompt rather than a finding. The question about any tenant is narrow and answerable. Does anything this tenant needs in order to operate name a street address?
If it does, the tenant’s permitted use and its physical premises are one object, and no lease clause separates them. A landlord holding both a relocation right and a continuous operation covenant has written two clauses that can order the tenant to do opposite things.
What paragraph 16 should have said#
The fix is not to delete the relocation right. Landlords need it, and for real reasons: assembling contiguous space for an anchor, backfilling a vacancy, staging a redevelopment. In the same way that a demolition clause is worth having but only bites when it is tied to an actual permit, a relocation right should be conditioned on the thing that has to be true for it to work.
Five edits, in descending order of what they are worth.
First, condition the tenant’s obligation to relocate on the issuance of every license, permit, registration and approval the permitted use requires at the replacement premises. This is the whole ballgame. It makes licensing part of the clause instead of a fact the clause ignores.
Second, and this is where Sibley Plaza turns, say what happens when that condition fails. If the permits cannot be obtained after diligent application and any appeal, the relocation notice is void and the lease continues unchanged. It must not convert into a landlord termination option. As paragraph 16 was drafted, the licensing failure was the landlord’s exit, so the clause rewarded the outcome nobody wanted.
Third, replace the “mutually agreeable” formula or make it symmetric. A consent right whose only consequence is a unilateral termination option is not a consent right. If disagreement gives the landlord an exit, give the tenant one too, or fix the terms in advance and take the negotiation out of it: comparable size, comparable frontage and visibility, landlord builds the replacement space to match, landlord pays moving, fixturing, signage, reprinting, license fees and the cost of any appeal.
Fourth, key the notice period to the licensing calendar rather than to ninety days. Here the city process ran from the May denial to the November agenda pull and still failed. Ninety days is a moving company’s timetable, not a regulator’s. Where a license is involved, the clock should start when the replacement permit issues.
Fifth, if you want a force majeure clause that does more than postpone, write that. “Excused for so long as” and “terminable if the event continues beyond X days” are different clauses from “extended to the extent performance is delayed,” and the court has now said out loud that the parties could have included such language and did not.
A tenant with a license-locked use should also take the plain remedy: if the landlord requires relocation and the permits do not follow, the tenant may terminate without penalty and recover its unamortized improvement costs. Staying put will not be on the menu.
The forum is harder and I would not oversell the fix. Eviction jurisdiction and its defenses come from statute, and you cannot contract your way into pleading frustration of purpose at a housing court hearing. A consultation or cure period before termination buys delay. The reliable protection is the condition precedent in edit one, not a promise about where the fight happens.
Does your portfolio know which tenants cannot legally move?#
Two questions, and most landlords cannot answer either from the documents they have.
Which of your leases contain a relocation right, and of those, which ones treat a failure to agree as a landlord termination option rather than as the notice simply lapsing? Those are different clauses with different economics and they read almost identically on the page.
Then the harder one, which is a join rather than a lookup. Which of your tenants hold a license or registration tied to their street address, and does that jurisdiction impose a buffer, a cap, or a grandfather right that attaches to the location? Answer that and you know, before you send the notice, which relocation rights are exercisable and which ones are a twenty-six month eviction.
That is the work Acrebase is built for. It is an AI contract negotiation platform for commercial real estate teams: it drafts, redlines and proofreads leases and other CRE documents, extracts the clauses out of an existing portfolio so the two questions above become queries instead of a summer of reading, and keeps a team’s approved clause library and negotiation playbook consistent from one deal to the next. Decide once that a relocation clause must condition the move on permit issuance and must make a permit failure void the notice, and that language and its fallbacks sit in the playbook for the next associate papering a shopping center amendment. Prior negotiations feed it too, so the position you took last time on comparability and moving costs is where you start. Learn more at acrebase.com, or get in touch about pricing.
If you are a landlord, your relocation right is only as good as the replacement premises is usable, and usable is a licensing question you can research before serving a notice rather than after. If the use is license-locked and the ordinance has a buffer, the relocation right inside your own center may be unexercisable however well drafted, and knowing that in April beats winning an appeal two years later. When you do proceed, keep the record. The emails showing a property manager working the city process for his tenant are why this ended in summary judgment rather than a trial on good faith.
If you are a tenant, the geographic limit you negotiated into the relocation clause is not the protection you think it is, and the “mutually agreeable” language is the landlord’s termination trigger wearing your name. Before signing, ask one question about every space in the center you could be moved to. Would my license follow me there? If the answer is no or unknown, condition the relocation obligation on the permits issuing, make a permit failure void the notice, and get a termination right for yourself. And understand the forum. If it comes to an eviction, your best arguments about impossibility are not arguments you will be allowed to make, at least not in that courtroom and not before you are out.
Footnotes
[1] Sibley Plaza Limited Partners, LP, et al. v. MSP Tobacco and Vapor, Inc., No. A25-2169 (Minn. Ct. App. 20 July 2026) (nonprecedential), affirming Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-HG-CV-25-2066. Bentley, J., with Ede, P.J., and Halbrooks, J. (retired judge serving by appointment under Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10). Peter J. Gleekel and Aaron S. Brown of Larson King LLP for the lessors; Carol R. M. Moss and Steven R. Liening of Hellmuth & Johnson for the lessee. Source for every fact, date and quotation about the lease and the dispute in the text above, including the full paragraph 16 relocation clause, Article 31 (holding over) and Article 37 (force majeure, performance “extended to the extent that the performance of such act or acts shall be delayed by . . . governmental regulations or controls,” excluding “payment of monies”); the April 2024 discussions; the 17 May 2024 relocation notice with its 31 August termination date, its extension to 30 September for a license appeal, and the retained discretion to “allow for more time to work through the city process”; the denial “under Saint Paul Legislative Code section 324.04(b)(1), (2) (2023)”; the legislative aide’s emails; the “Notice of Violation and Request for Imposition of $500 Matrix Penalty”; the 2025 termination and notices to quit; the district court’s finding that “Sibley Plaza actively engaged in efforts to assist MSP Tobacco in lobbying for an amendment to the city’s geographical ordinance”; the dictionary construction of “delay” and “extend” from The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 479, 626 (5th ed. 2018); the landlord’s unreached alternative argument that MSP Tobacco “could operate a different business that does not need a tobacco license”; and footnote 3, disposing of the exercised renewal option. https://mn.gov/law-library-stat/archive/ctapun/2026/OPa252169-072026.pdf and https://law.justia.com/cases/minnesota/court-of-appeals/2026/a25-2169.html
[2] Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c): nonprecedential opinions and order opinions “are not binding authority except as law of the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel, but nonprecedential opinions may be cited as persuasive authority.” I did not check whether MSP Tobacco petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court for review, so treat the case as final at the court of appeals for the purposes of this post and not as a statement about its procedural posture today. https://www.revisor.mn.gov/court_rules/rule/aprcap-136/
[3] Saint Paul Legislative Code ch. 324 (Tobacco), as amended by Ord 21-29 (3 November 2021) and Ord 23-52 (13 December 2023). Section 324.01(b): a license “must be issued to the person, firm or corporation that operates the principal business at that address.” Section 324.02 (“License for each location”): a license “permits the licensee to sell licensed products at retail at the one (1) location specified in said license, and a separate license is required for each location.” Section 324.04(b)(1): “The total number of tobacco shop licenses issued under this chapter will not exceed one hundred (100). The total number of tobacco products shop licenses issued under this chapter will not exceed fifteen (15),” with a grandfather for “[e]stablishments or locations holding either tobacco shop or tobacco product shop licenses on July 31, 2021, or with an application of a license pending on July 31, 2021, that is ultimately granted,” subject to compliance, a one-year lapse limit, and no prior revocation. Section 324.04(b)(2) is the buffer and its measurement rule, quoted in the text. Section 324.05: “Any change in the location of the place of sale will require a new license application.” Section 324.07(k) prohibits redeeming any “price reduction instrument” and selling “through any multi-pack discounts (e.g., ‘buy-two-get-one-free’)” or below the listed price. Section 324.07(l)(3): “Retail stores holding a tobacco products shop license are permitted to sell and offer for sale flavored tobacco products,” which is why the fifteen-license category is the valuable one. Ord 23-52 cut the caps from 150 to 100 and from 25 to 15. https://www.stpaul.gov/sites/default/files/2024-04/Tobacco%20Shop%20Licenses_Handout_With%20Acknowledgement%20Form%20_4-26-2024.pdf and https://stpaul.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=6405453
[4] Clark v. City of St. Paul, 934 N.W.2d 334, 338 (Minn. 2019), cited by the court of appeals as an example of contract language that excuses performance when a force majeure event occurs, rather than merely postponing it. https://law.justia.com/cases/minnesota/supreme-court/2019/a18-0075.html
[5] Fitness International, LLC v. City Center Ventures, LLC, No. A22-1057, 9 N.W.3d 526 (Minn. 24 July 2024) (Moore, III, J.). A health club in Hopkins, Minnesota, closed by executive order for roughly 3.5 months in 2020, sought to recover the rent it had paid. Syllabus point 2: summary judgment for the landlord was appropriate because “even assuming that the doctrine of temporary frustration of purpose may be used as the basis for a breach-of-contract claim and not only as an affirmative defense, the commercial lease tenant’s obligation to perform under the lease agreement was merely suspended during the period of temporary frustration, not discharged.” The court adopted Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 265 and 269 as the frameworks for permanent and temporary frustration; § 269 provides that temporary impracticability or frustration “suspends the obligor’s duty to perform while the impracticability or frustration exists but does not discharge his duty or prevent it from arising unless his performance after the cessation . . . would be materially more burdensome.” The Sibley Plaza court cited the same case for its definition of a force majeure clause. https://mn.gov/law-library-stat/archive/supct/2024/OPA221057-072424.pdf
[6] In re Hennepin County 1986 Recycling Bond Litigation, 540 N.W.2d 494, 502 (Minn. 1995): “Under Minnesota law, every contract includes an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requiring that one party not unjustifiably hinder the other party’s performance of the contract,” and parties may not “take advantage of the failure of a condition precedent when the party itself has frustrated performance of that condition.” Sterling Capital Advisors, Inc. v. Herzog, 575 N.W.2d 121, 125 (Minn. App. 1998): bad faith is a refusal “to fulfill some duty or contractual obligation based on an ulterior motive,” and does not include a party “asserting or enforcing its legal and contractual rights.” https://law.justia.com/cases/minnesota/supreme-court/1995/c8-94-1145-3.html
[7] Minn. Stat. § 504B.285, subd. 1(a)(2) (holding over “after termination of the time for which it is demised or leased to that person . . . contrary to the conditions or covenants of the lease or agreement under which that person holds, or after any rent becomes due”) and subd. 1(a)(3) (“any tenant at will holds over after the termination of the tenancy by notice to quit”); subds. 2 and 3 set out the retaliation defenses. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Hanson, 841 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Minn. App. 2014): eviction actions “are summary proceedings that are intended to adjudicate only the limited question of present possessory rights to the property.” https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/504B.285
[8] SVAP III Riverdale Commons LLC v. Coon Rapids Gyms, LLC, 967 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. App. 28 September 2021). A fitness center that signed a ten-year lease in December 2017 stopped paying rent for April through July 2020 after the governor’s closure order, while retaining access to the premises. Holding at 86-87: the tenant “may not defend against SVAP’s eviction action by asserting the common-law doctrines of impossibility or frustration of purpose.” Reasoning: the habitability and retaliation defenses recognized in Fritz and Olson are residential only; “the task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court”; and the current eviction statute, unlike the version quoted in Fritz, no longer permits a defendant to plead “all matters in excuse, justification, or avoidance,” providing only that “the defendant may answer the complaint” at the court appearance specified in the summons, per Minn. Stat. § 504B.335(a). Footnote 2 preserves the doctrines for “another type of action, such as an action by SVAP to recover damages for CRG’s unpaid rent, an action by CRG for reformation or rescission, or an action by CRG alleging ejectment,” citing Berg v. Wiley, 226 N.W.2d 904 (Minn. 1975), and notes that an eviction judgment “is not a bar to an action involving the title or right of possession.” https://mn.gov/law-library-stat/archive/ctappub/2021/OPa201593-092721.pdf
[9] Minn. Stat. § 340A.101, subd. 15 (defining “licensed premises” as “the premises described in the approved license application”); § 340A.412, subd. 3 (a municipality “may not issue more than one off-sale intoxicating liquor license to any one person or for any one place,” with “person” reaching officers, directors, agents, employees and affiliates); § 340A.412, subd. 4(a) (no intoxicating liquor license may issue in areas “restricted against commercial use through zoning ordinances,” or “within 1,000 feet of a state hospital, training school, reformatory, prison, or other institution under the supervision or control, in whole or in part, of the Direct Care and Treatment executive board or the commissioner of corrections,” among other listed places). Subdivision 4 was amended by 2026 c 48 s 6; I read the 2025 text and did not trace the 2026 amendment, so check it before relying on the list. https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/340A.412
[10] Minn. Stat. § 342.13(c): a local unit of government “may adopt reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of the operation of a cannabis business provided that such restrictions do not prohibit the establishment or operation of cannabis businesses,” and “may prohibit the operation of a cannabis business within 1,000 feet of a school, or 500 feet of a day care, residential treatment facility, or an attraction within a public park that is regularly used by minors, including a playground or athletic field.” Section 342.13 was amended by 2026 c 123 s 15. Retail registration is separately governed by § 342.22. https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/342.13
[11] 21 C.F.R. § 1301.12(a): “A separate registration is required for each principal place of business or professional practice at one general physical location where controlled substances are manufactured, distributed, imported, exported, or dispensed by a person.” Subsection (b) exempts certain warehouses, sales offices holding no stock, prescribing-only offices of a practitioner registered elsewhere in the same state, and approved freight forwarding facilities. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-21/part-1301/section-1301.12
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